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ABSTRACT:
Agent-based modeling and simulation is an interesting approach to modeling systems comprised of autonomous,
interacting agents. Computational advances have made possible a growing number of agent-based models across
a variety of application domains.
This paper describes a generic approach to use agent-based modeling for risk analysis. It presents a novel generic
model facet for representing risk analysis and fault tree propagation in an agent model, where the goal is to
simulate the behavior of a system in normal and degraded mode by using multi-agents systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
Risk analysis is the discipline to identify and assess
risks for a system, activity or process according to
the severity of their consequences which may vary
from moderate to disastrous. Today, many methods
are available and widely used in order to conduct risk
analysis [Flaus, 2013a] such as Preliminary Hazard
Analysis (PHA) and Failure Mode Effects Analysis
(FMEA)[Papadopoulos et al., 2004].
In [Kanj and Flaus, 2014], we have proposed a meta
model suited to socio-technical systems. It allows the
description of the system to analyze and provides risk
analysis results, and required aspects of a dynamical
system behavior in order to automatically perform
simulation under degraded conditions.
In this work, we propose to analyze the system’s
performance in degraded mode. For complex systems,
this analysis can only be made via simulation. A si-
mulation model may be considered as a set of rules
(e.g. equations, flowcharts, state machines, cellular au-
tomata) that define how the system being modeled will
change in the future, given its present state. Simula-
tion is the process of model “execution” that takes the
model through (discrete or continuous) state changes
over time.
Many approaches may be used for Simulation mo-
deling, such as :
– System Dynamics (SD), developed by the elec-
trical engineer Jay W.Forrester in the 1950s. It is
mainly continuous and is characterized by a high
abstraction level, low details and a strategic level ;
– Discrete Event (DE), which roots back to 1960s
when Geoffrey Gordon conceived and evolved
the idea for GPSS and brought about its IBM
implementations [Gordon, 1961]. This model is
based on the concept of entities, resources and
block charts describing entity flow and resource
sharing, it is mainly discrete and characterized by
a middle abstraction level, medium details and a
tactical level ;
– Agent Based (AB), which is known by many
names. ABM (agent-based modeling), ABS
(agent-based systems or simulation), and IBM
(individual-based modeling) are all widely used
acronyms. These models are essentially decentra-
lized and preferred for complex systems. They
can range from high to low abstraction levels.
As the systems we consider are complex in terms of
multiplicity of units, decentralization of decision ma-
king, and number of relationships between its compo-
nents, we will use an “ABS”.
In this paper, we propose a generic model facet for
representing risk analysis and fault propagation in an
agent model. This facet can be built in a systematic
manner from model based risk analysis and is made of
the following elements :
– a set of behavioral modes and an associated acti-
vity model represented as an activity UML model.
– a set of events and a dysfunctional model repre-
sented by a bow tie model.
– a set of transition rules to describe the interaction
between these models
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 we give a basic representation of the multi-
agents systems (MAS) and define the agents, their
attributes and their relations. Section 3 presents the
second part of our model, which is built while we
perform the risk analysis. In this section we explain
how to adapt a multi-agents system to risk analysis
. Section 4 presents an illustration of this approach
for risk analysis for dangerous good transportation.
Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM (MAS)
2.1 Definition of an agent
In literature, a variety of definitions exist to des-
cribe what an agent is. One example, described in
[Ferber and Perrot, 1995], defines an agent as a physi-
cal or virtual entity :
– which is able to act in an environment,
– that can communicate directly with other agents,
– which is driven by a set of trends (in the form of
individual goals or function of satisfaction, even
survival), it seeks to optimize,
– which has its own resources,
– which is able to receive (to a limited extent) its
environment,
– which may or may not have only a partial repre-
sentation of this environment,
– which is expert and provides services,
– which can eventually reproduce,
– whose behavior tends to meet its objectives, ta-
king into account the resources and expertise avai-
lable to it, and according to its perception, its
representations, and communications it receives.
Another definition is that proposed in
[Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995] which defines
the following characteristics of an agent :
– Autonomy : an agent operates alone without the
direct intervention of a third party (human or
otherwise), and undergoes no control over the
actions carried out or on its internal state.
– Social capacity : agents interact with each other
(and probably with humans) through communica-
tion languages and common sociability rules.
– Reactivity : the agent perceives its environment
(physical or model) and response in a timely man-
ner to changes that occur in it.
– Pro-activity : agents do not simply react to stimuli
from their environment, they must be able to show
behavior directed by internal goals and this by
taking initiatives.
2.1.1 Properties of an agent
The concept of agents is closely related to the ob-
ject oriented approach used in modern programming
languages such as Java or C++. Thereby an object is
defined by its states and behavior, whereas agents can
be seen as objects with more extended capabilities
(see Figure 2.1) (e.g., rules of behavior, autonomy, co-
operation (e.g., perception, action, communication),
mobility, memory, learning ability, among others. Co-
operation, which is considered as a core capability of
an agent, comprises, e.g., perception and action (inter-
action) and communication.
FIGURE 2.1: Agent properties
2.2 Definition of MAS
The multi-agent system is a software technology
in great demand to model and simulate the dynamic
behavior of complex and decentralized systems.
Historically, these systems are positioned at the in-
tersection of programming (software), artificial intel-
ligence (decision-making autonomy) and distributed
systems (decentralization). The field of multi-agent
systems has emerged in the 80s under the name of arti-
ficial intelligence (Huhns, 1987) in the USA and decen-
tralized artificial intelligence (Demazeau and Müller,
1990) or multi-agent systems Europe.
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is an upcoming ap-
proach in complex systems science to model struc-
tures comprising autonomous and interacting elements.
Some scientists even denote this computer simulation
based modeling approach "A New Kind of Science"
and argue, that besides deduction and induction, ABM
and simulation is a third way of doing science.
The basic idea of ABM is to model only the units
- called agents - of a specific system and to simulate
their interplay in order to derive and analyze the total
system behavior.
Building an agent based simulation is composed of
three parts :
– Define the set of agents and the environment
which contains all agents : we define for each
agent a set of attributes, behavior modes, and re-
sources, and for the environment, we define its
characteristics, responsibility and functions ;
– Identify for each functions, its characteristics and
attributes ;
– Specify the interactions in the system.
2.3 Interactions between agents
In a multi-agent system, an agent is in mutual inter-
action with other agents. Two types of communication
can be observed for an agent :
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– agent-agent ( direct communication) : is carried
in an intentional way by sending messages to one
or more well defined recipients ;
– environment-agent or indirect communication :
is carried either through the environment (not
intentional action), leaving traces or signals, or
through a chalkboard (intentional action) filing
and reading information filed in a shared data area.
In this type of communication, the recipients are
not defined.
3 AGENT-ORIENTED RISK
To adapt the model-based agents to our risk analy-
sis, we added some additional characteristics to our
classical agent in order to obtain a new risk oriented
agent architecture (see Figure 3.1) :
1. behavioral modes : described by a list of succes-
sive blocks
2. failures modes : for expressing the risk and dys-
function analysis of our agents
3. relationships between failure modes and patterns
of behavior of our agents.
FIGURE 3.1: Agent oriented risk
Then we are used the FIS modeling tool to model
our multi-agent system, The structure of each agent is
composed of three views :
1. Structural view
2. Dysfunctional view
3. Behavioral View
3.1 Structural view
This part describes the structure of an agent, by sho-
wing its relations with its environment (other agents)
and the characteristics of each of them.This basic view,
allows us to enter into the dysfunctional or behavioral
view.
3.1.1 Structure of the agent
The basic element is the agent, seen as an intelli-
gent entity capable of interacting with its environment
and with other agents, execute tasks described by an
organized set of activities that use resources or agents
(personnel, equipment and machinery, ...) to transform
inputs into outputs agents. It is described internally
by :
1. Structural elements that are defined with a list of
properties of accumulated resources and behavio-
ral rules.
The property list of an agent may contain :
– a type, that defines the class under which the
agent belongs ;
– a name, which specifies the name to identify
the agent from the other agents in its environ-
ment ;
– a list of variables or characteristics : for each
characteristic, define a name, a type and a do-
main of validity.
The rules of behavior vary by agent. They in-
clude :
– The rules of sophistication
– The cognitive load
– The internal models of the external world
– The memory used
2. The functional elements (FE), called
activities or tasks for an agent. An acti-
vity can be either active or inactive at a given
time t. Its behavior is characterized by a set of
variables, and eventually by a behavioral model
describing the temporal evolution.
3.1.2 Links between activities and resources
Relationships can take place between the functional
elements of an agent and other agents in its environ-
ment, which is necessary to perform an activity (see
Figure 4.1). These relationships are of three types :
– input relations : sometimes a number of agents
is requested in entering an activity. These agents
are either consumed or provide information that
is used ;
– outputs relations : other agents are either genera-
ted or their status are changed, it is the case of a
material agent that is produced, or object that is
assembled agent, ... ;
– relationships of use : in this case, the agents are
considered supports for the function. For example,
to advance, a truck agent use a driver agent.
3.1.3 Relationships between agents
Many relationships can be defined between agents.
We distinguish :
– composition : during their lifetime, agents can be
joined to form a super agent who possess all of
their properties, memory resources and rules of
behavior ;
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FIGURE 3.2: Relations
– communication : since agents are intelligent sys-
tems, they can communicate with their environ-
ment, respond to changes and exchange know-
ledge with other agents, information and data ;
– decomposition : an agent can decompose to give
birth to several other agents possess a copy of
the knowledge and father Agent resources with
different attributes ;
– influence : agents can influence each other espe-
cially if they are at a certain point in the same
geographical area, the relationship of influence
can lead to other types of relationships such as :
loss of an agent (composition), creation of an
agent (decomposition) or a data change agent
(communication).
3.2 Dysfunctional view
Dysfunctional view describes the propagation of
failure between model elements. For example, a failure
of an input or support resources for an activity may
cause the failure of the activity or may produce an
output resources in a degraded state. Each failure is
represented by a fault tree (see Figure 3.3), where
events are related to each others by links representing
causal relationships and connectors such as AND and
OR connectors. Two categories of failure sources for
an activity can be observed :
1. Failure related to the activity : in this case, the fai-
lure becomes from its inputs, supports resources ;
2. Exterior failure related to others agents or to the
environment : usually, this kind of failure requires
a common resource or a communications between
the failing agent and the agent executed the ac-
tivity, for example, during the advancement of a
truck, a collision between two vehicles (exterior
failure mode) at the road (common resources bet-
ween the truck agent and the vehicles) may lead
to a delay during the truck advancement ;
Once, this view is built, we can define the set of
failure modes for each agent’s activity in the system.
Afterward, we add the set of exterior failure in order
to obtain for agent’s activity a set of failure mode.
Each failure mode is described by :
– a name ;
– a set of events, causes for this mode, connected
using AND and OR gates represented in the fault
FIGURE 3.3: fault and Event Tree
tree (see Figure 3.3) ;
– a set of events ,consequences of the failure, repre-
senting in the event tree (see Figure 3.3) ;
– and a time t representing the activation time of
this mode.
Failure mode is denoted by fmodei. The normal
mode of an activity is defined as :
ok
∧
i
qdfmodei
3.3 Behavioral view
This view describes the dynamic behavior of a multi-
agent system. Once, we have this view, it is possible
to simulate the operation of the system, in normal
or degraded modes. In addition, some elements of
this view can be exploited for diagnosis or prognosis
[Flaus, 2013b, Giap et al., 2009].
3.3.1 Activity Diagram
The behavior of each agent is described by an ac-
tivity block diagram (see Figure 3.4). For an agent,
many behavioral modes are possible, however, at a
precise time t, only one mode is active while the others
are inactive. A behavioral mode represent a program
for the agent with many input parameters. A mode has
FIGURE 3.4: Behavioral mode of an agent
a current state (active, inactive) which is updated in
each step of the simulation. It may contain many types
of blocks :
1. A start event block : This is the first block exe-
cuted by an agent, it indicates the existence of a
new agent in the environment ;
2. An end event block : This is the last block execu-
ted by an agent, it indicates the end of life of an
agent ;
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3. An activity block : Each behavioral mode is asso-
ciated with one or more activities, which can be
of the following types :
– a simple modification activity of the informa-
tional state, described by a mathematical re-
lationship and an execution duration (may be
null). In general, this type of block is intended
for the execution of simple tasks (an affecting
statement, increment of a variable) as follows :
x = 1.
– a continuous action : this type of block is gene-
rally used in simulation with continuous events
, where it is important to represent the change
of variables over time. The following equation
shows a usage example of using of this block :
x(k+1)=x(k)+b
More precisely, this kind of activity is defined
by a= name, x← fa(x), δ where x is a vector
of variables defined as the model element or
the set of model elements via a structural link
Ns(me), and δ is a positive integer represen-
ting the time t=δ.Ts.
– a transformation activity : this type of activity
involves interaction between an agent and other
agents in its environment or between the agent
and its environment, and can lead to changes in
the characteristics of the agents and the environ-
ment.It can be considered as an entity proces-
sor and used to represent the processing flow
diagrams (see Figure 3.5). It is defined by :
– a transformation relation :
∑
nimei|φi..→
nsmes|φs
−→
∑
nomeo|φo{mi}
where mei is an input model element, requi-
red in number ni and which must satisfy the
condition φ, which a logical relation expres-
sed with respect to the variables, the attri-
butes and the events available in the scope.
meo is an output andmes is a model element
representing a support ;
– a positive integer duration δ representing the
time t=δ.Ts, and/or a set of final conditions ;
– a set of input actions ;
– a set of output actions ;
It is also possible for an interaction of this kind
to create new agents in the environment or kill
existing agents. This type of activity is some-
times complex. We can decompose it into a list
of simple activities.
4. A gateway block : it used for testing the value of a
Boolean equation. This type of block contains just
the expression to be tested and returns a Boolean
value that indicates whether the expression is true
or false, which determines the next block of the
agent. Usually, this block is followed by 2 blocks,
the first block is active when the equation is true
and the second is active when it is false.
5. A block with many successors : this type of block
is used to represent the position of an agent that
executes more than one block after the execution
of a block. In this case, once the execution of
the block is completed, all successor blocks are
activated .
6. A block with many predecessors : this type of
block is used to represent the position of a block
that is active only when several blocks are already
executed.
FIGURE 3.5: Transformation Activity
When a behavioral mode for an agent becomes ac-
tive, we execute its first block (usually the start event).
We then identify its successor block and check if it is
an activity block. If not, we propagate the activation. If
the next block is of type gateway we test its expression
to determine its successors. When a block has an acti-
vity block as successors, we test all input and support
elements (agents) of this activity block. If they are all
available, this activity block becomes active running :
– we execute its input actions and make time t =
current time ;
– we execute its task when t + duration of block is
less then current time ;
– Once, current time = t + duration of block, we
execute the output actions of the block, we des-
troy its input, we release its support and output
agents, and this block becomes inactive.
A behavioral mode of an agent is finished when we
execute its final block (end event).
3.3.2 Relations between dysfunctional and
behavioral views
During the construction of our multi-agent model :
1. We define the set of our agents and a behavioral
mode for each agent called default behavioral
mode ;
2. For all agents, we define the set of failure modes
associated for each activity in the default mode ;
3. For each failure mode, we define a corresponding
behavioral mode (see Figure 3.7) (for example :
if failure mode FA11 is active we activate beha-
vioral mode Mode 2). Sometimes many failure
modes can have the same behavioral mode with
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some interior changes in the behavior of the ac-
tivity. A behavioral mode can be defined by a
combination of failure modes (if FA11 and FA12
are active we activate behavioral mode Mode 4).
Now, for each agent in the environment, we have :
– a set of variables ;
– a set of behavioral modes : with one representing
the normal mode (defined by default) and the
others representing the dysfunctional modes ;
– a set of dysfunctional modes : which contains the
set of failure modes of all activities agent ;
– a set of relations between the functional and be-
havioral mode ;
It should be noted that a behavioral mode for an
agent is normal, if all its failure modes are false.
The number of behavioral modes of an agent may
be up to 2n where n : is the number of its failure modes.
The number is, however, usually much less as a same
behavior mode is associated to several failure modes.
3.3.3 Transition rule from a mode to another
At each step in the simulation, a test is carried out
on the entire agent failure modes. This allows us to
identify which failure modes should be true in the next
step. Based on the value of each failure mode, we
can determine if the current behavioral mode remains
active for the next step or replace it by another mode. If
it is to be replaced, we must stop all running activities
that correspond to the old mode and activate the new
mode. This can be established by :
– stopping the current activity which is the old
mode ( by putting it in inactive state, destroying
its inputs elements and releasing its support and
outputs elements) ;
– activate the first block in the novel mode.
Figure (3.6) shows an activity of an agent A, which
has two failures modes FA11 and FA12. Each failure
mode is represented by a fault tree as shown in (fi-
gure 3.6). For each failure, we define a corresponding
behavioral mode (see Figure 3.7). For each of the va-
lues FA11 and FA12, we obtain a behavioral mode of
the agent (if FA11 and FA12 are false, the behavioral
mode of the agent is Mode 1, else if FA11 is true, the
behavioral mode is Mode 2,...).
FIGURE 3.6: Failure modes for an activity
FIGURE 3.7: Relation between functional and behavioral view
4 EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION
In this section, we apply the proposed approach on
a hazardous material road transportation system. We
use the multi-agents System to simulate our system
under Repast [Collier, 2003]. We lay out the moving
activity. We construct the structural, the dysfunctio-
nal and the evolution views. This activity presents the
advancement of the truck agent along a predefined
path. To achieve such advancement, many entry agents
are required such as, the truck loaded with hazardous
materials in position 1, the driver, the road segment
(to advance the truck), and the weather provider, the
traffic density provider (to calculate the probability of
a failure). The needed output agents is the truck in
position 2. The truck is seen as modified resources.
Moving will change the truck position after advan-
cement. The driver, the road segment, the provided
weather, and traffic density are seen as supports for the
Moving function. They are reserved prior to Moving
and released at the end. Figure 4.1 shows the relations
of Moving describing in the above.
To secure the advancement, we should take
note about the quantity and the quality of loa-
ded products, and eliminate any loss or accident
that may occur during the advancement (e.g., ac-
cident between two vehicles on the road or acci-
dent between the truck and a fixed object on the
road). A Moving failure may come from two cases
[Flaus and Granddamas, 2002][Wirth et al., 1996] :
– loss of containment during the truck advancement
caused by a structural failure or a containment
bypass ;
– accident during moving (related to weather condi-
tions, road characteristics and moving conditions
along the advancement) ;
Figure 4.2 shows the failure mode loss of containment
of a moving activity described in a fault tree and figure
4.4 shows the failure mode accident for the activity
described in a Fault tree [Karagiannis et al., 2010]. Fi-
gure 4.3 presents the set of behavioral modes of truck
agent. Table 4.1 represents the FMEA of the Moving
activity and table 4.2 illustrates the behavioral mode
related to each failure mode. Initially, we operate in
the normal mode of the truck agent.
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TABLE 4.1: FMEA of Moving activities
Agent failure mode cause effect action
or element
Agent driver LOC Container evacuation calculate the number
truck containing water toxic inhalation of impacted people
Wrong closure of
the container.
Agent truck LOC Cooling evacuation calculate the number
truck malfunction toxic inhalation of impacted people
Failure of
the heating system
Agent segment accident Type of death calculate the number
(related road) segment area, injuries of impacted people
Roadways
characteristics.
Agent provider accident (related to Congestion in death calculate the number
traffic density traffic density) the road. injuries of impacted people
Agent provider accident Bad weather death calculate the number
weather (related weather) conditions during injuries of impacted people
the advancement.
TABLE 4.2: Failure modes of Moving activity and the related behavioral modes of the truck agent
failure related equations severity
mode behavioral calculation
mode
No normal mode pk1(x, y) = pk(x, y) +(v× te)
failure pk1(x, y) : position of the truck at step k+1,
pk(x, y) : position of the truck at step k,
v : average speed of the truck,
te : sampling time,
qk1 = qk.
qk : quantity of Materials in the truck at step k,
qk1 : quantity of Materials in the truck at step k+1.
LOC Mode 2 pk1(x, y) = pk(x, y), Gr = f(pk1(x, y), qk1, cd, dp, td, cm, te)
truck qk1 = qk − (td × te) Gr : severity of the failure
(f1) if advancement with cd : code of danger of Materials in the truck,
LOC dp : population density in the area of the truck,
pk1(x, y) = pk(x, y)+(v× te) cm : weather conditions in the area of the truck,
qk1 = qk − (td × te) td : leakage rates.
accident Mode 3 pk1(x, y) = pk(x, y), if thermal or explosive effect :
(f2) if we have thermal Gr = f(pk1(x, y), qk1, cd, dp, te)
or explosive effect (case 1) :
qk1 = 0 if toxic effect :
if toxic effect (case 2) : Gr = f(pk1(x, y), qk1, cd, dp, td, cm, te)
qk1 = qk − (td × te)
LOC Mode 4 pk1(x, y) = pk(x, y), if thermal or explosive effect :
followed case 1 Gr = f(pk1(x, y), qk1, cd, dp, te)
by qk1 = 0 if toxic effect :
accident case 2 : Gr = f(pk1(x, y), qk1, cd, dp, td, cm, te)
(f3) qk1 = qk − (td × te)
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FIGURE 4.1: Relations of the moving activity of the truck agent
FIGURE 4.2: Fault tree loss of containment (LOC truck)
FIGURE 4.3: Behavioral modes of the truck agent
FIGURE 4.4: Fault tree accident
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a new approach for
risk analysis based on multi-agents. For each agent in
the system, we define its activities, attributes, a list of
failure modes and a list of behavioral modes. The main
interest of this meta model is that it allows the repre-
sentation of risk analysis and dynamical behavior in
a coherent manner, which can be used to simulate the
behavior of a system in normal or degraded conditions
...This was illustrated throughout an example of a mo-
ving of a truck agent loaded with hazardous materials.
One of our future goals is to apply our meta model to
a system containing a large number of active agents.
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